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THE NAVAL QUESTION

Secretary Hughes won his fight for the 5-5-3 ratio in capital ships as between the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, which was pending when the December issue of the *ADVOCATE OF PEACE* went to press. As forecast in that issue, however, the capital-ship tonnage of each of these three nations was slightly increased. That was due to agreement to allow Japan to keep the *Mutsu*, which would have been scrapped under the original Hughes specifications, and to consequent proportionate adjustments of American and British tonnage.

Negotiations on this question were consummated on December 15, when the following was issued by the Subcommittee on Naval Limitation:

The Japanese Government has found special difficulty with respect to the *Mutsu*, as that is their newest ship. In order to retain the *Mutsu*, Japan has proposed to scrap the *Settsu*, one of her older ships, which, under the American proposal, was to have been retained. This would leave the number of Japan's capital ships the same—that is, 10—as under the American proposal. The retention of the *Mutsu* by Japan in place of the *Settsu* makes a difference in net tonnage of 13,600 tons, making the total tonnage of Japan's capital ships 313,300 tons as against 299,700 tons under the original American proposal.

CHANGES IN SHIPS

While the difference in tonnage is small, there would be considerable difference in efficiency, as the retention of the *Mutsu* would give to Japan two (2) post-Jutland ships of the latest design.

In order to meet this situation and to preserve the relative strength on the basis of the agreed ratio, it is agreed that the United States shall complete two (2) of the ships in course of construction—that is, the *Colorado* and the *Washington*—which are now about 90 per cent completed, and scrap two (2) of the older ships—that is, the *North Dakota* and the *Delaware*—which under the original proposal were to be retained. This would leave the United States with the same number of capital ships—that is, 18—as under the original proposal, with a tonnage of 525,850 tons, as against 500,650 tons, as originally proposed. Three (3) of the ships would be post-Jutland ships of the *Maryland* type.

As the British have no post-Jutland ships, except one Hood, the construction of which is only partly post-Jutland, it is agreed that, in order to maintain proper relative strength, the British Government may construct two (2) new ships not to exceed 35,000 legend tons each—that is, calculating the tonnage according to British standards of measurement or according to American calculations, the equivalent of 37,000 tons each. It is agreed that the British Government shall, on the completion of these two (2) new ships, scrap four (4) of their ships of the *King George V* type—that is, the *Erin*, *King George V*, *Centurion*, and *Ajax*—which were to have been retained under the original American proposal. This would leave the British capital ships in number 20, as against 22 under the American proposal. Taking the tonnage of the two (2) new ships according to American calculation, it would amount to 74,000 tons, and, the four ships scrapped having a tonnage of 96,400 tons, there would be a reduction in net tonnage of 22,400 tons, leaving the British tonnage of capital ships 582,050 instead of 604,450. This would give the British, as against the United States, an excess tonnage of 56,200 tons, which is deemed to be fair, in view of the age of the ships of the *Royal Sovereign* and the *Queen Elizabeth* types.

The maximum limitation for the tonnage of ships to be constructed in replacement is to be fixed at 35,000 legend tons—that is, according to British standards of measurement or according to American calculations, the equivalent of 37,000 tons—in order to give accommodation to these changes. The maximum tonnage of capital ships is fixed,

for the purpose of replacement, on the basis of American standards of calculation, as follows:

United States.....	525,000 tons
Great Britain.....	525,000 tons
Japan	315,000 tons

COMPARISON WITH ORIGINAL PLAN

Comparing this arrangement with the original American proposal, it will be observed that the United States is to scrap 30 ships as proposed, save that there will be scrapped 13 of the 15 ships under construction and 17 instead of 15 of the older ships.

The total tonnage of the American capital ships to be scrapped under the original proposal, including the tonnage of ships in construction if completed, was stated to be 845,740 tons. Under the present arrangement the tonnage of the 30 ships to be scrapped, taking that of the ships in construction if completed, would be 820,540 tons.

The number of the Japanese ships to be retained remains the same as under the original proposal. The total tonnage of the ships to be scrapped by Japan under the original American proposal, taking the tonnage of new ships when completed, was stated to be 448,923 tons. The total tonnage of the ships to be scrapped under the present arrangement is 435,328 tons.

Under the original proposal Great Britain was to scrap 19 capital ships (including certain predreadnaughts already scrapped), whereas under the present arrangement she will scrap 4 more, or a total of 23. The total tonnage of ships to be scrapped by Great Britain, including the tonnage of the 4 Hoods, to which the proposal referred as laid down, if completed, was stated to be 583,375 tons. The corresponding total of scrapped ships under the new arrangement will be 22,600 tons more, or 605,975 tons.

Under the American proposal, there were to be scrapped 66 capital fighting ships built and building, with a total tonnage (taking ships laid down as completed) of 1,878,043 tons. Under the present arrangement, on the same basis of calculation, there are to be scrapped 68 capital fighting ships, with a tonnage of 1,861,643 tons.

The naval holiday of 10 years with respect to capital ships, as originally proposed by the American Government, is to be maintained, except for the permission to construct ships as above stated.

This arrangement between the United States, Great Britain, and Japan is, so far as the number of ships to be retained and scrapped is concerned, dependent upon a suitable agreement with France and Italy as to their capital ships—a matter which is now in course of negotiation.

PACIFIC FORTIFICATIONS

In connection with this agreement upon the capital ship ratio between the three powers, a compact was made against further fortifications in the Pacific, excepting such territory as is treated as part of the home land of each nation. This compact was thus described in the Communique of December 15:

It is agreed that with respect to fortifications and naval bases in the Pacific region, including Hongkong, the *status quo* shall be maintained—that is, that there shall be no increase in these fortifications and naval bases, except that this restriction shall not apply to the Hawaiian Islands, Australia, New Zealand, and the islands composing Japan proper, or, of course, to the coasts of the United States and Canada, as to which the respective powers retain their entire freedom.

AGREEMENT PROVISIONAL

It will be noted that the agreement between the three powers was conditional upon a satisfactory arrangement being made with the other two powers in the naval conference—France and Italy. Almost immediately trouble

arose. The French claimed 350,000 capital-ship tonnage. Italy, while objecting to such a total either for herself or France, insisted that she must be on a parity with France. Great Britain would agree to no such tonnage for France and Italy if her own was to be reduced and limited, as provided in the 5-5-3 agreement. For a short time the situation was distinctly threatening.

But on December 20 an announcement from the Subcommittee on Naval Limitation set forth an agreement reached in direct correspondence between Secretary Hughes and Premier Briand, who had returned to Europe and was in London at the time. This agreement gave the French 175,000 capital-ship tonnage, one-half what they claimed, and the Italians were allowed the same total. That made the capital-ship ratio 5-5-3-1.75-1.75 for the United States, Great Britain, Japan, France, and Italy, respectively. The correspondence between Mr. Hughes and M. Briand was made public at the time the agreement was announced, December 20.

HUGHES TELEGRAPHS BRIAND

Mr. Hughes, it was shown, had cabled M. Briand on December 16, reporting the terms of the agreement between the United States, Great Britain, and Japan, and continuing:

The agreement, however, as to the number of ships to be retained by them is dependent upon an appropriate agreement with France and Italy with respect to their capital ships. Italy is desirous to reduce her capital ships, because of the obvious requirements of her economic life, to the lowest possible basis, and there will be not the slightest difficulty in making an agreement with Italy if we can reach a suitable understanding with France.

You will observe the attitude of France will determine the success or failure of these efforts to reduce the heavy burden of naval armament.

5-5-3 Reviewed

In dealing with Great Britain and Japan we have taken facts as they are. We have avoided an academic discussion of national needs and aspirations, which, in the nature of things, could not be realized. It has been pointed out that the ratio of strength in capital ships is that which exists, and that it is futile to desire a better one, for it cannot be obtained if nations with abundant resources build against each other in competition. The predreadnaughts possessed by the three powers are to be scrapped without any suggestion of replacement, and there has been a reduction of over 40 per cent of the naval strength represented by dreadnaughts and superdreadnaughts. Now France has 7 dreadnaughts, with a tonnage of 164,500. Reducing in the same proportion as the United States has reduced, her tonnage of capital ships would be fixed at 102,000, or if the predreadnaughts of France were taken into calculation on her side although omitted on the side of the United States, the total tonnage of France's capital ships being taken at 221,000, a reduction on the same basis would reduce France to 136,000 tons.

This would be the sacrifice of France if she made the same sacrifices that have been made by the other powers. We do not ask this. We are entirely willing that France should have the benefit of an increased tonnage which would preclude the necessity of her scrapping her dreadnaughts—that is to say, her present strength in dreadnaughts is about 164,000 tons, and there is not the slightest objection to allowing this and an increase over this, or a total of 175,000 tons, which would be more than 70,000 tons over what she would have on the basis of relative strength as it exists.

If it be said that France desires a greater relative strength, the obvious answer is that this would be impossible of attainment. If such an agreement as we are now proposing were not made, the United States and Great Britain would very shortly have navies of over a million tons, more than 6 to 1 as compared with France, and France would not be in a position to better herself, much less by any possi-

ble endeavor to obtain such a relative strength as has been suggested. In short, the proposed agreement is tremendously in favor of France by reducing the navies of powers who not only are able to build, but whose ships are actually in course of construction, to a basis far more favorable to France than would otherwise be attainable. The proposed agreement really doubles the relative strength of the French navy.

Agreement Up to France

In these circumstances I feel that the suggestion that has been made, that France should build 10 new capital ships in replacement with a tonnage of 300,000 tons or more, suggests a program of such magnitude as to raise the greatest difficulties. In fact, I regret to say that, after canvassing the matter thoroughly and taking the best information I can obtain, I am compelled to conclude that it would not be possible on this basis to carry through the agreement.

I need not point out to you our great desire, which you yourself have so eloquently expressed, that the economic burden of armament should be lifted. It is not against the interests of France that we express the hope that her industry and resources will be devoted to economic recuperation and the enhancement of her prosperity rather than be expended in the building of fighting ships. The particular situation of France with respect to land armament you have vividly portrayed, but that points, as it seems to us, to the very great importance of reduction in naval armament. At this time, when we are anxious to aid France in full recovery of her economic life, it would be most disappointing to be advised that she was contemplating putting hundreds of millions into battleships.

I have spoken to you thus frankly because of my deep appreciation of your friendship and of your solicitude for the success of the efforts we are making, and in the hope that the present matter, which represents, perhaps, the most critical position yet reached in the Conference, may be adjusted on a satisfactory basis. I repeat that the provisional agreement reached with Great Britain and Japan hinges upon an appropriate agreement with France, and I cannot too strongly urge the most careful consideration of all the matters to which I have taken the liberty to allude. Permit me to assure you of my highest respect and of the keen desire that we entertain in America that you should visit us again at an early date.

BRIAND'S ANSWER

Two days later M. Briand cabled Mr. Hughes from London as follows:

At the moment of my departure for London, Mr. Herrick handed me your friendly telegram in regard to the difficulties which have arisen in the Naval Disarmament Commission in reference to the tonnage of capital ships which have been asked for by the French delegation.

You fear that the maintenance of this French request may have as its effect to hinder the agreement between the five powers.

The will of the French Government is to do everything which is compatible with the care of the vital interests of France with a view to reconcile our points of view.

In the question of naval armament, the preoccupation of France is not the offensive point of view, but uniquely the defensive point of view.

With regard to the tonnage of capital ships—that is to say, attacking ships—which are the most costly, I have given instructions to our delegates in the sense which you desire. I am certain that I shall be sustained by my Parliament in this view.

But, so far as the defensive ships are concerned (light cruisers, torpedo boats, and submarines), it would be impossible for the French Government, without putting itself in contradiction with the vote of the chambers, to accept reductions corresponding to those which we accept for capital ships under this formal reserve, which you will certainly understand.

The idea which dominates the Washington Conference is to restrict naval armaments which are offensive and costly; but I do not believe that it is in the program to deny to a

nation like France, which has a large extent of coasts and a great number of distant colonists, the essential means of defending its communications and its security.

I am certain, my dear Mr. Hughes, that you will appreciate the effort of conciliation which we are making in order to respond to your request.

I beg you to kindly accept my cordial remembrances and the ardent wish which I form for the complete and striking success of the Conference over which you preside with so much authority and brilliancy.

SUBMARINES

M. Briand's reservation as to auxiliary ships, including submarines, was noted, but in the general rejoicing over the agreement on capital ships, it did not make a deep impression. Few realized how much weight it would have in subsequent sessions of the Naval Subcommittee. There was the great debate in the subcommittee upon the British proposal to abolish submarines. In that debate the British won a moral victory, in that they made their proposal a live issue in the court of public opinion, even though they did not carry their point. France, Italy, and Japan were unwilling to abolish the submarine. There was reason to believe that most of the American delegates were profoundly impressed by the British arguments, but since there was no present chance of abolition being effected, the American delegates did not declare definitely their views when the arguments were concluded.

LEE SPEAKS FOR BRITISH

Lord Lee of Fareham opened for the British on December 22. The substance of his argument, as given in the committee's communique, follows:

He wished to present as few figures as possible, but he felt it was necessary to mention the following as the basis of his statement. The figures as regards submarines were as follows:

	Existing tonnage.	American proposals.	Amount of new building permitted under the American proposals.
The United States of America	83,500	90,000	6,500
Great Britain	80,500	90,000	9,500
Japan	32,200	54,000	21,800
France	28,360	In proportion.	In proportion.
Italy	18,250	In proportion.	In proportion.

He felt bound to say that it seemed to him very strange to put before a Conference on the Limitation of Naval Armaments proposals designed to foster and increase the type of war vessels which, according to the British view, was open to more objections than surface capital ships. Moreover, it would be a certain consequence, if submarines were retained, that the powers which possessed large mercantile marines would be compelled to increase the numbers of their anti-submarine craft. This would give but little relief to the overburdened taxpayer and would provide scant comfort to those who wished to abolish war and to make it less inhumane.

ABOLITION ALONE WILL SUFFICE

The view of the British Government and the British Empire delegation was that what was required was not merely restrictions on submarines, but their total and final abolition. In explaining the position he wished to make clear that the British delegation had no unworthy or selfish motives. He would first like to reply in advance, since this might be his only opportunity of doing so, to the arguments of the friends of the submarine. He understood their first contention to be that the submarine was the legitimate weapon of the weaker powers, and was an effective and economical means of defense for an extensive coast-line and for maritime com-

munications. Both these standpoints could be contested on technical grounds and, as he would show, were clearly disproved by recent history. If some weak country possessed an exposed coast-line, it would, of course, desire to defend it against bombardment or the disembarkation of a military force.

It was necessary to ask, therefore, how such attacks were conducted in modern warfare. The reply was that they were conducted by powerfully armed, swift-moving vessels, fully equipped to resist submarine attack, to escort and protect the convoys of military transports. There was no branch of naval research which had more closely engaged the attention of experts than the counter-offensive against the submarine. He was giving away no secrets when he stated that the methods of detection, of location, as well as of destruction of submarines had progressed so much further than the offensive power of the submarines themselves that the latter had now already a reduced value against modern surface warships. This, however, was bringing him into somewhat technical subjects. During the late war Germany had concentrated her efforts on the use of the U-boat and had built up the most formidable submarine fleet that the world had ever seen up to the present time. He believed that Germany had employed no less than 375 U-boats of 270,000 tons in the aggregate. Of these no less than 203 had been sunk.

What had these U-boats accomplished in legitimate naval warfare? It was almost insignificant. In the early part of the war a few obsolescent ships, which sometimes were not taking proper precautions, had been sunk, but the British grand fleet throughout the war had not been affected; not one single ship had been sunk or hit by the action of submarines, whether at sea or in harbor. Our light cruisers had swept through all parts of the North Sea, and, wherever that sea had been clear of mine fields, had gone where they wished, undeterred by the submarine. Submarines had not prevented the passage of troops across the sea. No less than 15,000,000 British troops had crossed and recrossed the English Channel during the war, and not one man had been lost from the action of submarines except on board hospital ships, which, in the 20th century, it had been deemed would be immune from the attacks of submarines, and therefore had not been escorted. During the later months of the war some 2,000,000 United States troops had been brought across the Atlantic, and the submarine had proved equally powerless in their case. In fact, the U-boat, whether considered as an offensive or defensive weapon against any sort of organized naval force, had proved almost contemptible.

HOW USEFUL FOR COLONIES?

It had been maintained that submarines were useful for the defense of coast-lines and communications with colonies. He gathered from the press that this was one of the arguments used, and so it would have to be examined. If the argument was sound and if submarines were essential for this purpose, there was no country which would need them so much as the British Empire, which possessed a coast-line which, without wishing to boast, he believed was almost as large as that of all the five powers present at this Conference put together, and the length of which was four times the circumference of the globe, and which, in addition, had the longest trade routes of any country to protect. It was partly because our experience had shown that they were not effective for this purpose that we were ready to abandon submarines. The late war had made it abundantly clear that the greatest peril to maritime communications was the submarine, and that peril was specially great to a country which did not possess command of the sea on the surface; hence it was to the interest of any such power to get rid of this terrible menace; and in this connection it must be remembered that the submarine was of no value as a defense to be used against submarines. It was against merchant ships alone that they achieved real success.

THE GERMAN BLOWS AT COMMERCE

It would be as well to recall what the German submarine fleet had accomplished against mercantile marines. No less than 12,000,000 tons of shipping had been sunk, of a value of \$1,100,000,000, apart from their cargoes. Over 20,000 non-

combatants—men, women, and children—had been drowned. It was true that this action had been undertaken in violation of all laws, both human and divine. The German excuse for it had been its effectiveness. They had used the same argument as in the case of poison gas, which had set a precedent which appeared likely to endure for all time, now that nations had been driven to resort to it. The menace of the submarine could only be got rid of by its total banishment from the sea. That was the intention of the Treaty of Versailles, which had forbidden Germany to construct submarines, whether for military or mercantile purposes.

Were we to assume (Lord Lee continued) that Germany was always to be bad and the other powers were always to be good? Was there to be one rule for Germany and another rule for the rest of the world? In saying this he was not casting any reflection on any nation, and least of all on the officers and men of the submarine fleets. These men were the pick of their services, gallant and high-minded men; but they were obliged to obey orders; and experience had shown that occasionally governments could go mad. The view of the British Empire delegation, therefore, was that the only proper course was the abolition of submarines. Their limitation was not sufficient. His objection to limitation was that a submarine fleet could so very rapidly be expanded in time of war. Submarines could only be built if the industry were kept alive, and a personnel could only be provided if a trained nucleus existed. Hence it was only by means of abolition that this menace to the mercantile marine of the world could be got rid of.

He had said earlier in his remarks that the British Empire delegation were animated by no selfish motives. At the same time it would be foolish not to recognize that Great Britain was the nation most exposed to the menace of the submarine. So long as submarine warfare continued, it would be the greatest menace to the food supplies on which our country was dependent. The British people lived on a crowded island whose soil only produced two-fifths of its supply of food. For the remaining three-fifths they relied upon sea communications. On an average, only seven weeks' stocks were maintained in the country. By far the greatest anxiety which the British Government had felt during the war was to prevent the reserves of food falling to zero.

THE NEGATION OF HUMANITY

Was it surprising, therefore, if, with a danger in front of them as great as any to which M. Briand had so eloquently explained France was subject, the British people protested against a weapon which was the negation of humanity and civilization itself? There were some people who said it was this vulnerability of Great Britain which justified the retention of the submarine, since it was by these means alone that the British Empire could be stricken down. The late war had shown, however, that the British Empire was not easily stricken down, and if war should ever come again, it can be imagined that means would be found for our country to save itself from starvation.

But it might be claimed, if the U-boat had begun its operations earlier or had had better luck, the result might have been different. To this he would reply that the British navy had constituted almost the keystone of the Allied arch; but for the British navy, France would have been ruined, Belgium would have been overrun, and even the United States of America, self-contained, self-supporting, with vast resources, would have been impotent to intervene and might have had to abandon its army and all that it had in France or else to make a humiliating peace.

That would not have been a disaster to Great Britain alone. That was why he resented the idea, which had been published in a part of the press, that the abolition of submarines was merely a selfish and unworthy design. It had been suggested that the conditions of the late war might never recur. Could France be sure of this? Could France run the risk of a disaster to her near neighbor and only certainly ally if the situation of 1914 were ever reproduced? It was necessary to take long views in this matter, and the British Empire delegation believed that they were fighting

the battle not only of the Allied and associated powers, but of the whole civilized world, in advocating the abolition of the submarine.

POWER OF WORLD OPINION

He felt sure that some one would ask, How can we feel sure that if we abolish submarines other powers who are not represented here will not proceed with the building of submarines? The same question might be asked as to other classes of craft mentioned in the American scheme. He found it impossible to believe that other powers would set themselves against the opinion of the rest of the civilized world regarding this particular weapon. If, however, the great naval powers should at some future date find themselves exposed to piracy by the action of some smaller power, surely they would find the means of bringing Nemesis to the transgressor. World opinion was a very powerful weapon, and certainly some means would be found by which the great naval powers could protect themselves if necessary.

SHALL WAR BE CHEAP?

It was said that submarines were a cheap method of warfare. Surely this Conference did not desire to make war cheap? When war had been cheap it had been almost continuous. He hoped the submarine would not be defended because it would be a weapon within the reach of all. It might, perhaps, be cheap for the aggressor, but it was not so for the victim. The average number of German submarines at sea simultaneously during the late war had not been more than nine or ten, but Great Britain had had to maintain an average of no less than 3,000 anti-submarine surface craft in order to deal with these. It could be seen, therefore, that it was a very expensive form of war for the defender.

The British delegation were anxious to contribute toward the ideals of the present Conference. They desired not only a limitation of armaments, but also a limitation of expenditures, which constituted so great a burden in time of peace. That was why Great Britain, which had the tradition of possessing the greatest navy, had welcomed the proposals for curbing capital ships. What should we gain, however, if this competition were merely transferred to submarines? Certainly not much; and meanwhile the submarine threatened our very life and existence. But if the submarine were abolished we could accept, with modifications in detail, practically the whole of the American proposals in regard to the lightening of these burdens.

Lord Lee said he was not impressed with the argument that because it was found impossible to deal effectively with poison gas or air bombs, which were by-products of essential industries, we could not deal with the submarine. The submarine was not a by-product of any industry, but was essentially an offensive weapon. He therefore said that it could be, and therefore ought to be, abolished. It was a weapon of murder and piracy and the drowning of non-combatants. It had been used to sink passenger ships, cargo ships, and even hospital ships. Technically, the submarine was so constructed that it could not be utilized to rescue even women and children from sinking ships. That was why he hoped that the Conference would not give it a new lease of life.

LIMITED IN DEFENSE

He had endeavored to state frankly that the submarine was only to a limited extent a weapon of defense, and that for offense it was only really valuable when used against merchant ships, and that it constituted the greatest peril to which the mercantile marine of the world was exposed. For defense, he did not say it was useless, but merely inefficient, and that the disadvantages exceeded the advantages, except for war on the mercantile marine. The submarine was the only class of vessel for which the Conference was asked to give—he would not say a license, but permission to thrive and multiply. It would be a great disappointment if the British Empire delegation failed to persuade the Conference to get rid of this weapon, which involved so much evil to peoples who live on or by the sea.

To show the earnestness of the British Government in

this matter, Lord Lee pointed out that Great Britain possessed the largest and probably the most efficient submarine navy in the world, composed of 100 vessels of 80,000 tons. She was prepared to scrap the whole of this great fleet and to disband the personnel, provided the other powers would do the same. That was the British offer to the world, and he believed that it was a greater contribution to the cause of humanity than even the limitation of capital ships.

However, it was useless to be blind to the facts of the position, and he hardly hoped to carry with him all the powers present at that table, though he believed that in the end all civilized powers would come round to the British point of view. In any event, the British Empire delegation did not intend that the settlement in regard to capital ships should be affected if they failed to carry their point in regard to the abolition of submarines. Should he fail to convince his colleagues, he would nevertheless welcome any suggestions for the reduction and restriction of submarines which they might like to make, and in particular he would await with the greatest interest the proposals of his French colleagues, which had been promised earlier in the day.

When Lord Lee sat down, Mr. Hughes complimented him, but corrected Lord Lee's figures as to existing tonnage. American naval experts, Mr. Hughes said, reported the tonnage as follows: United States, 95,000; Great Britain, 82,464; France, 42,850; Italy, 20,228; Japan, 31,400.

THE FRENCH CALL SUBMARINE DEFENSIVE

The communique sets forth the following expressions from the French, Italian, and Japanese delegations, following Mr. Hughes' interpolation:

M. Sarraut, in paying tribute to the able statement of Lord Lee, joined with the other delegations in expressing his profound disapproval of the barbarous use which was made of submarines in the late war.

The French delegation recalled the fact that the question of the use of submarines had already been dealt with during the discussions at the Peace Conference, as well as by the League of Nations, and that public opinion had shown itself favorable to the continuance of submarines.

The French delegation believed that the submarine was pre-eminently a defensive weapon, especially for nations scantily supplied with capital ships.

In its present state, the submarine had proved itself to be unequal to gaining control of the seas and could not be considered as a dominating weapon. Moreover, it was undeniable that the submarine could be used under honorable conditions, and it was certain that these conditions should be examined, discussed, and formulated in such a way as to determine the laws of sea warfare, in conformity with the lessons and precepts drawn from the late war.

In view of these facts, the French delegation therefore felt called upon to give its approval to the use of the submarine, under the restrictions already outlined. It wished to point out that, in view of the technical considerations governing the use at sea of these vessels, subject as they are to frequent withdrawal from service, it would be necessary for a navy to possess a number of them which would be proportionate to the needs of national defense.

The French delegation wished, moreover, to observe that the use of large submarines was, under existing conditions, undoubtedly more in accordance with the laws of humanity, which demand that the crews of torpedoed vessels should be rescued. Finally, submarines with a large cruising radius are, in the opinion of the French delegation, necessary to assure the defense of distant colonies and possessions, as well as to maintain the safety of lines of communication between the mother country and the possessions or colonies for which she is responsible.

THE ITALIAN VIEW

Senator Schanzer said:

We have been listening with the greatest attention and sympathy to Lord Lee's important speech.

In the name of the Italian delegation, I wish to declare with the greatest sympathy upon anything that can make war less inhuman.

The Italian delegate in the Subcommittee for Poisonous Gases, in this same Conference, proposed the abolition of these gases.

Nevertheless, the submarine question is mainly one of a technical nature. Lord Lee has asserted that submarines are not efficient means of defense.

Our naval experts do not share this opinion. They think that the submarine is still an indispensable weapon for the defense of the Italian coasts, which have a very great extension and along which some of our main centers, our principal railways, and a number of our most important industrial establishments are situated. Our naval experts are, furthermore, of the opinion that submarines are necessary to protect the lines of communication of our country, which for the greater part depends upon the sea for its supplies. We are not ready today to resolve these doubts of a technical character.

We venture to observe, moreover, that we do not think this Conference, in which only five powers are represented, could resolve the question of submarines, which can concern many other powers which are not present here. For these reasons and in spite of our appreciation of the humanitarian arguments brought forward by Lord Lee, we are not today in measure to associate ourselves with the proposal of abolishing submarines and we are not authorized to do so.

THE JAPANESE FOR RESTRICTIONS

Mr. Hanihara said:

Japan was unconditionally opposed to all abusive uses of submarines, such as those recently committed by a certain nation. However, Japan felt that a legitimate use of submarines was justifiable as well as necessary, from the point of view of defense. He suggested that the international rules of war be so modified as to vigorously guard against abusive use of submarines.

ADVISORY COMMITTEE'S REPORT

Mr. Hughes spoke again, saying there was at least one point upon which all the delegates seemed in accord. That was restriction of the use of submarines, to prevent recurrence of the horrors of the last war. Still declining to take an official position upon the value of the submarine for legitimate defense, Mr. Hughes then read the report on the submarine made to the American delegation by the American Advisory Committee. It follows:

In the recent World War the submarine was used in four general ways:

- (a) Unlimited use against both enemy and neutral non-combatant merchant vessels.
- (b) Use against enemy combatant vessels.
- (c) Use as mine-planters.
- (d) Use as scouts.

Whatever is said about unlimited warfare by submarines is also true of unlimited warfare by surface craft, provided the combatant wishes to violate the rules of war. The confederate cruisers destroyed all property, but not lives. The English expected the Germans in the latter part of the World War to use surface craft for unlimited warfare and had provided means to offset this. However, the Germans, with one exception, were unable to get out of the North Sea. The *Moeve*, a surface ship, sank almost all merchantmen that she came into contact with, saving the lives of the crews. So that unlimited warfare is not necessarily an attribute of the submarine alone.

SUBMARINE AGAINST COMMERCE

The unlimited use of submarines by Germany against commerce brought down upon her the wrath of the world, solidified it against the common enemy, and was undoubtedly the popular cause of the United States entering the World War.

The rules of maritime warfare require a naval vessel de-

siring to investigate a merchant ship first to warn her by firing a shot across her bow, or in other ways, and then proceed with the examination of her character, make the decision in regard to her seizure, place a prize crew on her, and, except under certain exceptional circumstances, bring her into port, where she may be condemned by a prize court.

The rules of procedure (1917), as laid down for United States naval vessels when exercising the right of visit and search, make no exception in favor of the submarine. In the early part of the World War the German submarines exercised this right of visit and search in the same manner as surface vessels. When sunk, the papers and crew of merchant ships so visited were saved. Later, when the cases came up in a German prize court, sitting on appeal at Berlin, the responsibility of the German Government was often acknowledged and indemnities paid. When unlimited submarine warfare commenced, in some cases where necessary evidence was produced by the owners making claim in the prize court, the court decided that the matter was outside the pale of the prize regulations, though it did not deny the justice of the claim.

Assuming that a merchant ship may be halted by a submarine in a legitimate fashion, it becomes difficult, because of limited personnel, for the submarine to complete the inspection, place a prize crew on board, and bring her into port. It is also difficult for her to take the passengers and crew of a large prize on board, should circumstances warrant sinking the vessel. However, these remarks are applicable to small surface crafts as well.

During the World War, on account of the vulnerability of the submarine and on account of the probability of its sinking the vessels it captured, the tendency was for all merchant ships (including neutrals) to arm themselves against the submarine. Such action greatly hampers the activity of the submarines and tends toward illegal acts both by the merchant vessels and by the submarine. In other words, the general tendency of submarine warfare against commerce, even though starting according to accepted rules, was sharply toward warfare unlimited by international law or any humanitarian rules. This was because the vulnerability of the submarine led the Germans to assume and declare she was entitled to special exemptions from the accepted rules of warfare governing surface craft. The merchant ship sank the submarine if it came near enough; the submarine sought and destroyed the merchant ship without even a knowledge of nationality or guilt.

SUBMARINES CAUSE ARMING OF MERCHANTMEN

Submarines were largely responsible for the extensive arming of merchant vessels, neutral and belligerent, during the World War. The average merchant vessel could not hope to arm effectively against enemy surface combatant vessels, and as a rule submits to visit and search without resistance. Prospects of saving the ship and certainty of safety to personnel have caused them to accept as the lesser risk the visit of belligerent surface vessels. When, however, as in the World War, they met a belligerent submarine, with a strong probability of being sunk by that submarine, the law of self-preservation operated and the merchant ship resisted by every means in its power. Defensive armament was almost sure to be used offensively in an attempt to strike a first blow. The next step was for each to endeavor to sink the other on sight.

War on commerce by surface combatant craft causes change of ownership of merchant vessels only, provided the surface craft does not sink these ships; but these merchant vessels for the most part remain in service; they are not destroyed. The world does not lose them. The object of war on commerce is not to destroy shipping, but to deprive the enemy of its use. Submarine warfare on commerce, if unlimited in character, injures the enemy and greatly injures the world as well. The world is so highly organized and so dependent on ocean transportation that shipping is essential to livelihood; without it vast populations would starve.

At present, when war breaks out, belligerent vessels tend to transfer to neutral flags and also to fly false flags. This hampers lawful warfare by submarines, as, owing to their great difficulty in making the proper visit and search, it is

thus impossible for them to prevent belligerent commerce from going forward.

The net results of unlimited submarine warfare in the World War were (a) flagrant violations of international law, (b) destruction of an enormous amount of wealth, (c) unnecessary loss of many innocent lives, and (d) to draw into the war many neutrals.

Unlimited submarine warfare should be outlawed. Laws should be drawn up prescribing the methods of procedure of submarines against merchant vessels, both neutral and belligerent. These rules should accord with the rules observed by surface craft. Laws should also be made which prohibit the use of false flags and offensive arming of merchant vessels. The use of false flags has already ceased in land warfare. No one can prevent an enemy from running "amuck" but immediately he does he outlaws himself and invites sure defeat by bringing down the wrath of the world upon his head. If the submarine is required to operate under the same rule as combatant surface vessels, no objection can be raised as to its use against merchant vessels. The individual captains of submarines are no more likely to violate instructions from their government upon this point than are captains of any other type of ship acting independently.

SUBMARINES AGAINST COMBATANT SHIPS

Against enemy men-of-war the submarine may be likened to the advance guard on land, which hides in a tree or uses underbrush to conceal itself. If the infantry in its advance encounters an ambush, it suffers greatly, even if it is not totally annihilated. However, an ambush is entirely legitimate. In the same fashion a submarine strikes the advancing enemy from concealment, and no nation cries out against this form of attack as illegal. Its navy simply becomes more vigilant, moves faster, and uses its surface scouts to protect itself.

The submarine carries the same weapons as surface vessels, *i. e.*, torpedoes, mines, and guns. There is no prohibition of their use on surface craft and there can be none on submarines. Submarines are particularly well adapted to use mines and torpedoes. They can approach to the desired spot without being seen, lay their mines, or discharge their torpedoes and make their escape.

The best defense against them is eternal vigilance and high speed. This causes added fatigue to the personnel and greater wear to the machinery. The continual menace of submarines in the vicinity may so wear down a fleet that when it meets the enemy it will be so exhausted as to make its defeat a simple matter.

The submarine, as a man-of-war, has a very vital part to play. It has come to stay. It may strike without warning against combatant vessels, as surface ships may do also, but it must be required to observe the prescribed rules of surface craft when opposing the merchantman, as at other times.

THE SUBMARINE AS A SCOUT

As a scout, the submarine has great possibilities; it is the one type of vessel able to proceed unsupported into distant enemy waters and maintain itself, to observe and report enemy movements. At present its principal handicaps are poor habitability and lack of radio power to transmit its information. However, these may be overcome in some degree in the future. Here, again, the submarine has come to stay; it has great value, a legitimate use, and no nation can decry its employment in this fashion.

Then followed a statement of the proposal of the United States for limitation of naval armament, so far as submarines are concerned, as made at the opening session of the Conference.

The report continued:

A nation possessing a great merchant marine protected by a strong surface navy naturally does not desire the added threat of submarine warfare brought against it. This is particularly the case if that nation gains its livelihood through overseas commerce. If the surface navy of such a nation were required to leave its home waters, it would be

greatly to its advantage if the submarine threat were removed. This could be accomplished by limiting the size of the submarine so that it would be restricted to defensive operation in its own home waters. On the other hand, if a nation has not a large merchant marine, but is dependent upon sea-borne commerce from territory close aboard, it would be necessary to carry war to her. It would be very natural for that nation to desire a large submarine force to protect the approaches on the sea and to attack troop transports, supply ships, etc., of the enemy. Control of the surface of the sea only by the attacking power would not eliminate it from constant exposure and loss by submarine attacks.

UNITED STATES AGAINST UNLIMITED WAR

The United States would never desire its navy to undertake unlimited submarine warfare. In fact, the spirit of fair play of the people would bring about the downfall of the administration which attempted to sanction its use. However, submarines acting legitimately from bases in our distant possessions would harass and greatly disturb an enemy attempting operations against them. They might even delay the fall of these possessions until our fleet could assemble and commence major operations.

It will be impossible for our fleet to protect our two long coast-lines properly at all times. Submarines located at bases along both coasts will be useful as scouts and to attack any enemy who should desire to make raids on exposed positions.

The submarine is particularly an instrument of weak naval powers. The business of the world is carried on upon the surface of the sea. Any navy which is dominant on the surface prefers to rely on that superiority, while navies comparatively weak may but threaten that dominance by developing a new form of attack to attain success through surprise. Hence submarines have offered and secured advantages until the method of successful counter-attack has been developed.

The United States navy lacks a proper number of cruisers. The few we have would be unable to cover the necessary area to obtain information. Submarines could greatly assist them, as they cannot be driven in by enemy scouts.

The cost per annum of maintaining 100,000 tons of submarines, fully manned and ready, is about thirty million dollars. For the work which will be required of them in an emergency, this cost is small when taken in connection with the entire navy. The retention of a large submarine force may at some future time result in the United States holding its outlying possessions. If these colonies once fall, the expenditure of men necessary to recapture them will be tremendous and may result in a drawn war, which would really be a United States defeat. The United States needs a large submarine force to protect its interests.

The committee is therefore of the opinion that unlimited warfare by submarines on commerce should be outlawed. The right of visit and search must be exercised by submarines under the same rules as for surface vessels. It does not approve limitation in size of submarines.

On December 23 Admiral de Bon, on behalf of the French, replied in the session of the Naval Committee to Lord Lee's argument. He began by citing the report of the American Advisory Committee against the Lee argument, and then made his own argument, which was summarized thus in the official communique:

In the first place, it had been denied that the submarine was really an efficient weapon, which was an essential consideration, since, if this was admitted, it was obvious that there would be almost no reason for building submarines.

The submarine, as a weapon against warships, could not be considered useless. If it was indeed true that the great fleet was able to remain at sea during several months in the midst of the submarines without any of its ships being hit, it should be remembered that France lost three battleships and five cruisers and had several other ships torpedoed—130,000 tons in all. To this list he could add a certain number of battleships lost by Great Britain and by Italy.

Finally, the offensive action of the submarines necessitated the construction of a considerable defensive system, and this certainly had an influence toward weakening the general forces of the nations engaged.

As a means of defense, the submarine had not been found useless. It could not, he thought, be denied that, if Germany maintained her coast intact, it was not solely because of the barrier of mines with which she had protected it. This could have been crossed by any force suitably provided with mine-sweepers if a force of submarines, supplementary to the mine defenses, had not rendered the approach to them really dangerous.

In the Adriatic the submarines also formed one of the most powerful means of action for the enemy.

In the Dardanelles the Allies felt the effect of the use of submarines not only during the major actions, but also during the long months during which they remained, holding tight to the point of Gallipoli Peninsula. The bombardments which the Allies were led to make against the Turkish position were always considerably hindered by the means of protection of the ships which they were compelled to take on account of the presence of threat of submarines in those waters. The Allies had, moreover, paid for their efforts with the loss of several ships.

In fighting war ships the submarine could be employed as a scout or rather as an observation post.

Every one knew the great extent to which the submarine lends itself in wireless communications. It was obvious that this observation post, so difficult to detect, could approach very near to the enemy, watch his operations, and carry either to the fleet which it is convoying or to its governing authority information which could not otherwise be obtained, especially for navies which have no powerful surface craft at their disposal.

In a word, as Admiral de Bon said, the submarine had proved its worth as a means of attack against war ships as in the protection of coasts.

The submarine had shown itself especially efficient against merchant marine.

It was not necessary for him to recall the very considerable results obtained in the submarine warfare waged by Germany against the commercial fleets of the world. The mind could not without horror return to this subject, which had struck terror to all peoples.

But that which had caused this terror was not the fact that the Germans attacked the merchant vessels of their enemies, but that they had not respected either the neutral flag nor steamers loaded with non-belligerents, nor even the transports for the wounded, which should have been protected by the Red Cross flag, which flag, however, even on land, they had often seen fit to violate. It had always been admissible to attack the enemy's merchant marine, and he thought it would always seem legitimate to do so. In fact, it had always been one of the most effective means of seriously crippling one's adversary.

If, taking an extreme case, one might consider it possible to bring one's adversary to the point of yielding by this process, would it not be less cruel and less wasteful of human life than military operations which would arrive at the same result by direct application of force.

One might protest against this interpretation, but such would be the result of a blockade, which is a legitimate practice, and its effects would not be peculiar to submarines.

He understood quite well that if this kind of war were allowed it would have to be confined within certain limits to prevent it from violating the laws of humanity. That was the precise point on which was based the charge that all had agreed in bringing without mercy against the Germans. But the accusation was brought against the men and not against the instrument that they had made use of.

In order to impart to the war which they had decided on the horrible character which they thought would cause our energies to yield, the Germans had purely and simply sunk the boats which they stopped. It would be recalled that at the beginning of the submarine campaign the Germans had aimed, above all, to inspire terror, and expected to obtain from it a moral effect on which they based their hopes. In fact, nobody could have forgotten the propaganda launched at the beginning of 1915 with all the mighty and wily means

of German propaganda. It aimed almost exclusively at a moral effect. It was only later on that they took into consideration the material results which could be surely secured by submarine attacks against commercial fleets, and that they enlarged progressively their acts of piracy.

If it was undeniable that Germany had misused the submarines against commercial fleets beyond all criticism, could one contend that it would have been impossible for her to act otherwise?

Moreover, had not the Germans misused, and to excess, practically all their other weapons?

In the first place, one could not deny that they might have avoided attacks against neutral ships, and not have torpedoed passenger ships without warning, especially hospital ships.

The success of their fight might have been materially lessened; but they would certainly have gained from a moral viewpoint, and the German submarines would not have lost the respect of the civilized world.

And, then, was it not permissible to think that war against the enemy commercial ships could have been waged differently? Suppose, for instance, that meeting a merchant ship a submarine advised her that she would be destroyed as soon as security for the crew was assured, either by proximity to the shore or by means of relief. It would prescribe a route to the ship and bring it to a safe place where it would sink it, after having removed the crew.

That was merely a supposition and he would not attempt here to formulate a doctrine, but the delegates would find in it a thought similar to that which guided the sailors of other days when they were making a prize and taking it to port, or until it had been taken from them by the enemy.

It might be said that the submarine was exposed to great risks; but were not the frigates and the corsairs of other days exposed to great risks in similar operations? How many of them had perished either in the defense of their capture or because they had been unable to escape the attacks of their enemies in the course of the voyage?

Certainly, the fruits of submarine warfare would have been smaller if they had been obliged to confine themselves to the limits of honorable warfare; but it was impossible to claim that there would have been none.

He knew very well that to sink a ship, even while saving the lives of those on board, was a questionable act and might be inadmissible. That was a question of law which ought to be settled by confining such actions to the cases where it was absolutely necessary.

In passing, he would call their attention to the fact that the cruel use to which the Germans had put their submarines was not confined to this type of vessel. Merchant vessels had been seized and, in order to turn them into cruisers, they had been immediately armed. Their crews were retained aboard and forced to take part in naval actions. This practice, while less inhuman than that inflicted on the crews that were abandoned on the high seas, was nevertheless indefensible.

It followed from this that the activities of submarines against merchant vessels should be confined within limits that would render their use legitimate. A proper set of rules ought to be drawn up with this object in view. They should be adopted whenever they undertook a revision of the rules for applying international law, which it was imperative should be revised, not only as applied to submarines, but with regard to all life at sea in time of war.

Submarine activity against the enemy's merchant fleet might be very effective. No one had been able to listen without great emotion as Lord Lee recalled the hours of anguish that all those who had held the guidance of affairs during the war had known and lived through, when Great Britain, together at times with France, was threatened with being deprived of the supplies which were indispensable not merely for continuing the struggle, but to keep the nation alive.

That was the consecration of the power of the submarine when exerted to the full extent of its destructive possibilities, without regard for the limits imposed by the most rudimentary principles of humanity and respect for international law. Submarine activity, within the limits fixed by these considerations which should remain sacred to honor-

able opponents, against enemy transports and convoys could still be of great importance. It could be included among the legitimate methods of warfare as a useful factor, especially for nations which did not have a powerful navy.

In this connection another consideration occurred to him. It was said that the submarine could never be kept from bursting through the moral barrier which should limit its activities. It would always yield to the temptation to make unrestricted use of all its powers. Lord Lee had kindly paid the submarine officers and crews of all navies the compliment of stating that he believed them incapable of the acts imputed to the German submarines. All naval men would be grateful to him. But the honorable First Lord feared that officers and men might be confronted by formal orders from their governments, which might be driven by danger into the weakness of issuing such orders. He did not think any government would risk hereafter incurring such a responsibility. He thought, besides, that if every nation were to again be capable of making such an error, it would not hesitate to commit analogous excesses with other means—for example, with air forces, which could fill the world with even greater horrors.

Against the possibility of a government erring to such a point, all measures taken by the Conference would be in vain. A submarine was useful for fighting war fleets. It was useful for fighting merchant marines. The opinion of the French delegation was that it was especially the weapon of nations not having a large navy. It was, in fact, an element in naval warfare comparatively cheap, which could be procured in large numbers at a cost far below that of capital ships. It was certain that, in order to protect itself against submarines, a naval power was obliged to provide important means in the way of units for patrolling, searching, and attacking them.

At the time when the committee was occupied above all with economic questions, to the point that it was willing to give them precedence over the matter of the safety of nations, this seemed at first an argument worth remembering. One should notice, however, that in the formation of a counter-submarine fleet the experience of the past war had brought out the fact that France could utilize a considerable number of elements drawn from both the merchant marine and fishing vessels.

In consideration of this fact, the defensive measures necessary to provide against submarine attack might be notably reduced.

Moreover, this was an argument of a general nature and applied to every other naval weapon, from which, in his opinion, the submarine, as we view it now, did not greatly differ.

It seemed, in fact, that the submarine had henceforth the right to figure as an integral part of naval forces.

When it first made its appearance, no one knew to what precise use it might be put.

Even the Germans themselves, who in 1914 were several years in advance of other navies, as regard submarines, did not fully realize what use they would make of them. Almost two years of war went by before they definitely decided upon their plan of action, because their submarines had not yet been perfected.

If it was not possible at that time to determine the use which might be made of the submarine, the means for combating its activity were still more completely unknown. Unless one has been imbroiled in such circumstances, it is difficult to appreciate the formidable effort which was necessary to discover the indispensable means for destroying the submarine and to execute them in the midst of so violent a war, which had, up to that time, absorbed all the vital energies of the nations in the struggle upon land.

However it may be, if this small craft committed frightful depredations, it was not alone because the use made of it was barbarous in the extreme, but largely because, during many long months, there was almost nothing with which it could be combated.

At the end of the war the situation was changed, and when the armistice came the ravages of the submarines had been greatly lessened; the monthly destruction of merchant ships scarcely exceeded 60,000 tons, and the methods then in

preparation for coping with the danger would have considerably reduced this, while the number of submarines destroyed had been steadily increasing.

To sum up, in judging the submarine, it should not be considered at the time of the war and, above all, at that precise moment of the war when it was at the height of its effectiveness, but more in perspective and looking somewhat toward the future. As is the case with every new weapon, it first came upon its adversaries when they were without sufficient defense, and caused vast damage. Yet from now on, as Lord Lee emphasized, its power would be greatly limited; the risks of destruction which it must run have become very numerous. Without going as far as the First Lord in feeling that the submarine has become ineffective against its foes, it is possible to think that the struggle against the submarine may now be carried on under conditions comparable to that of any action between war ships.

A new phase has been reached in the life of the submarine; it will not be the last; there is no doubt that further great progress will be made in two directions—in the power of attack of the submarine and in the efficiency of methods for combating its operations.

In order to establish certainty upon this point, it is enough to recall the case of the torpedo-boat. Upon its appearance, this little craft was considered an instrument of such power of destruction that, in the view of many distinguished naval men and writers upon maritime subjects, the hour of great battleships had struck; to build them was no longer worth while. The people in France who favored this decision formed a large and influential group. What would have occurred if war had broken out at the moment of this fever in favor of torpedo-boats? Evidently, if use had been made of them as arbitrarily as of the submarines by the Germans, the damage caused by the torpedo-boats would, perhaps, have been less; but what was certain was that in many respects the conditions surrounding them were analogous to those affecting submarines.

However, the search for means to oppose the torpedo-boat was undertaken. And now not only had this small craft ceased to be an object of special dread, but it had developed into the destroyer or flotilla leader, and had been found to be the greatest engine of war against the submarine. In this way the instrument of terror of forty years ago had shown itself to be an especially efficacious defender of humanity.

Who says that the same thing will not come to pass in the case of the submarine? We note as a menace, which impresses itself greatly upon our minds, the advent of powerful airships, whose appearance each day strikes us as more real and more imposing. We foresee that they will be capable not only of attacks on land, at present almost irresistible, but also of formidable undertakings far out at sea. In the course of these struggles the airship can spread gas over a considerable area of the sea, paralyzing large ships, possibly squadrons. Then will we not look forward to utilizing the protection of the submarine, which, supplied with powerful means against aircraft, may circle around and guard the fleet? The capacity of submerging would enable these guardians temporarily to escape the blows of the adversary in the air. This you will say today is fanciful. Perhaps the future will show what the result will be.

Be that as it may, the last war has shown that hereafter the naval warfare can be carried on simultaneously under water, on the surface, and in the air; that is to say, we must, for the moment, consider the naval war of the future from this angle, if this greatest of misfortunes should, contrary to the wishes of all, some day occur.

These are actual facts, from which there is no possible escape. None of you would know how to undertake to stop the progress of human ingenuity. It has taken possession of the submarine domain. This is a fact which we are unable to prevent.

It is very certain that the submarine, the only device by which man has succeeded in navigating under water, cannot serve any industrial purpose or peaceful aim. This characteristic it shares with the torpedo-boat and with most other weapons.

I have set forth the views of the French navy relative to

the suppression of submarines. I have still a word to say on the importance of the number of submarines.

The figures which have been laid before the committee have emphasized the paramount consideration which must guide it in forming an opinion.

Lord Lee has stated that the Germans constructed 320 submarines and that generally they had only ten of them in active service at sea at any one time. This would indicate that the proposals for submarines to be constructed must be estimated on a basis considerably larger than that employed in fixing the number of these little boats that it is thought necessary to use.

In truth, we have not quite the same figures. We have estimated that on an average one can figure that the Germans had possessed 80 to 100 completed submarines which are still in existence. Of this number they were able to keep about 15 or 20 at sea at once. And the reduction thus noted from the number of existing submarines to the number in condition to use was due to two causes: the need to allow the crews to rest, and the need of maintenance of these small boats on which the wear and tear was terrific, making constant repairs necessary.

The Advisory Committee, whose perfectly clear, exact and precise report could be considered as an excellent base for estimating, had calculated 90,000 tons to be the tonnage necessary for the United States and Great Britain. No doubt that had been the limit of reduction which those wise men had considered reasonable. Taking it that one of the present submarines and *a fortiori* a submarine of a future type—an improvement on its predecessors, should have a tonnage of about 1,000 tons, the figures proposed by the American Committee represent 90 submarines of recent type; that is to say, 15 or 20 capable of simultaneous action. This seems indeed the minimum submarine strength a power desirous of making use of this contrivance should have.

It is proposed, however, to reduce this already very small number. If we fall below this limit we will end by having a force of no use whatsoever, and this measure will be nearly equivalent to abolishing the submarine. I think that in this Conference we should, at all costs, abstain from making decisions which may not be practicable and which, even before our thoughts are on the way to realization, may weaken these to the point that, instead of being an element of moral strength and confidence to the world, these decisions of the Conference might be a cause of doubt and anxiety.

My observation on the decrease of the tonnage seems to me all the better founded, in that it applies more forcibly in the case of the construction of submarines of a greater tonnage, the freedom to build which has been asked for by most of us.

Never has the program of navies gone forward more rapidly than now. It will lead us before long to increase the size of the submarine.

We are convinced that the idea of large-sized submarines could not be dismissed. If you impose too narrow a limit on submarine tonnage, you will obstruct the progress of submarine science. What you would accomplish on the one hand you would undo on the other.

To draw a conclusion from the foregoing, I think that we cannot reasonably limit submarine tonnage, since we have before us an entirely new weapon, concerning which no one of us can foresee the possible transformation and growth, perhaps in the near future.

If in spite of this idea—which is a menace to no one, first, because I think no one here can consider that any one of us could become the enemy of any other, and, secondly, because we can agree, in mutual confidence, to keep each other informed of our future constructions—you wish absolutely to fix a limit to submarine tonnage, I believe that 90,000 tons is the absolute minimum for all the navies who may want to have a submarine force.

THE BRITISH REPLY

Mr. Balfour replied to Admiral de Bon in these words:

Since the very remarkable statement of the anti-submarine case made by Lord Lee, there have been made two notable

contributions to this debate. One was the document which you, Mr. Chairman, read out yesterday, composed by the subcommittee of the Advisory Committee and passed by them. The other was the speech of the gallant admiral who has just sat down. I rather wish that the Advisory Committee could have heard that speech before they drew up their report. They had reached the conclusion that the destruction of commerce by submarines was not the proper business or the main business of submarines, as they were under the impression that regulations could prevent what they considered and what anybody must consider the most inhumane employment of this particular weapon of war; but had they heard the speech to which we have just listened they would have seen, I think, that while Admiral de Bon condemned, as we should all expect him to condemn, the inhumane use of the submarine against defenseless merchant ships, it was the action of submarines upon merchant ships which he regards as on the whole the most important use to which that weapon of maritime warfare can be put. I admit that there are other purposes to which he alluded, and I will come to them in a moment.

Let me ask, upon this question of the destruction of commerce on the high seas by means of submarines, is there any man who has listened to this debate, is there any man who knows what occurred in the late war, is there any man who knows what must occur in the course of any future war, who doubts that if submarines are sent on their dangerous and difficult mission on the high seas—one of the most difficult and most dangerous as well as one of the most disagreeable tasks which can be imposed upon a sailor—it is for something more important than the remote chance of destroying some well-guarded and efficient ship of war, and that if they are once let loose to deal with merchantmen it is incredible that in the stress of war their powers will not be abused in the future as they have been so grossly abused in the past? It is vain to dwell upon the fact, an absolutely undeniable fact, that the submarine is a useful scout; that the submarines, especially, if not solely, in the early stages of the war, did destroy a few unguarded and careless ships of war, and that the submarine will undoubtedly impose upon any attacking forces a degree of caution and an amount of precaution which no doubt the attacking forces would gladly welcome.

SAYS OBJECT IS COMMERCE DESTRUCTION

The main object they serve is clear, from Admiral de Bon's own speech—the destruction of commerce—and I cannot doubt, speaking for myself, that if it was thoroughly considered by the Advisory Committee, the conclusion they did come to would not be so very remote from that which has impressed itself upon the British delegation. Now, I do not in the least, nor unduly, minimize the utility of submarines for genuine war purposes, but I cannot help thinking that Admiral de Bon has exaggerated it. I can assure him that he is in error in supposing that the immunity from attack enjoyed by the German coasts was in the least degree due to their submarines. I speak with knowledge and authority upon that subject, and I can assure him that in that respect he is under some misapprehension.

Neither do I believe that you will find that submarines, on the whole, are any defense against a sudden attack by a ship of war upon an undefended coast town. That is, I believe, one of the objects which the Italian delegation think can be performed by submarines, but I very greatly doubt it. The Germans were able from time to time, without much difficulty, to send a swift ship over the North Sea to throw a few shells into an undefended port and seek safety in flight. That cost some suffering and destruction, but upon the question whether the cost of the damage done by a shell against an undefended town is greater than the cost of a shell itself, I have heard some high authorities throw doubt. I can tell my colleagues around this table that I remember one particular case in which an attack of that kind was made upon an open town on the east coast of England where there was a submarine; but it takes some time for a submarine to get ready; it takes some time for it to submerge; it takes some time to get up to a much swifter surface vessel; and though the submarine did its best, the aggressor

was far away safely over the horizon before anything could be done, either in the way of protection or revenge.

Is it not in the minds of all of us who followed the course of naval warfare that the British ships bombarded hour after hour the Flemish coast at Zeebrugge, which was full of submarines, if I remember rightly. The British ships bombarded Zeebrugge, and not on one single occasion did a single submarine destroy or injure a single British ship.

SUBMARINES AT THE DARDANELLES

Take the case of the Dardanelles. We lay opposite the Dardanelles, in the most perilous circumstances you could well conceive, month after month, with submarines prowling about, seeking what they could destroy. What they destroyed was quite insignificant, if I remember rightly. If submarines could not render it impossible for ships to lie more or less in the open opposite the Dardanelles, against a well-guarded fleet, it is very difficult for me to believe that they are going to prove, unless changes occur, a very efficient weapon in maritime warfare.

I do not wish to dwell upon that because I do not think, as I have already indicated, that it is the purely warlike use of the submarine which is really before us now. The question before us now is whether you are going to encourage an instrument of war which, if it be encouraged, if, indeed, it be permitted at all, will undoubtedly be used in the illegitimate destruction of commerce. Now who is that going to injure? There are two of the powers represented here who I think have little or nothing to fear or to consider in such a connection, and I do not think either Japan or the United States have anything whatever to fear from that kind of blockade. In the case of the United States they are self-contained and independent of imports, and the fact that they are very remote from any possible aggressor would make me, if I were a citizen of either of those two great and friendly States, very calm and easy upon the subject of submarines. That is two out of the five powers here represented. How about the other three?

Take the case of Italy. Italy is not an island, but, for the purposes of this debate, she almost counts as an island. I remember the extreme difficulty we had in supplying her even with the minimum of coal necessary to keep her arsenals and manufacturing going during the war. I doubt whether she could feed herself or supply herself or continue as an efficient fighting unit if she were really blockaded, if her commerce were cut off, which, please God, will never be. I am considering the effect of blockade. The fact that you are going to allow and give your general blessing to submarines—at least so I gather—puts it in the power of every State that has a seaboard at all to make itself a formidable, aggressive enemy.

You talk of the submarine as if it were by nature something that encouraged defense and discouraged attack. It is nothing of the kind. A State which is itself not dependent upon sea-borne commerce, but which has some access to the sea, can, without building a battleship, without having any great naval estimates, make itself one of the most formidable of aggressive powers to its maritime neighbors. Italy has five maritime neighbors in the Mediterranean. I hope and believe that peace, eternal peace, will reign in those waters and in those ancient homes of civilization. But we are considering these matters from, as it were, the cold and calculating point of view of a member of a general staff. He, looking at it without any political knowledge, without any foresight as to the trend of opinion, and merely considering how nations are situated, would say to Italy, "You have five neighbors, each one of which can, if it desires it, blockade your coast and make your position untenable without having a single surface ship of war at their disposal."

THE CASE OF FRANCE

Now I will take the case of France. France is nearly self-supporting in point of food, and France has a great land frontier, which gives her access, directly and indirectly, to all the great markets of the world. She has a position of great security from the side of the sea. M. Briand assured us in very excellent terms that she is in a position of very great insecurity by the side of the land, and he cer-

tainly indicated to an attentive world that France not only required a large army now, but, as events develop, she might again require assistance from overseas, across the Atlantic or across the Channel. This encouragement of submarines, this passionate declaration that it would be almost criminal to interfere with the growth of this promising, though at present infantile, weapon of war, how is that going to be met?

Here I must call attention to a fact which has hardly been touched upon or noticed in the course of this debate. The only notice taken of it, so far as I know, was in Admiral de Bon's speech which we heard just now, in which he said that of course it was true that the cost of navies would be increased by the fact that you had to find small craft to deal with submarines, if submarines were allowed. But he said you could get those small craft from merchant ships and from your fishing population. Now, can France and Italy get these people from their merchant ships and their fishing population? Allow me to read the figures. The whole war turned upon the possibility of keeping open communications between Europe and the United States of America, Great Britain, and France, and on supplying Italy with the absolute requisites of national life. That was the most difficult problem of the war. Before that, you had to develop to the utmost your auxiliary craft which deal with submarines. Every one of the three countries had to do everything they knew to carry out their object. These are their comparative contributions to it: France, 257 ships; Italy, 288 ships; Great Britain, 3,676 ships.

If that war had been fought without Great Britain, where are the merchant ships and where are the sailors, where are the fishing folk that would have manned the only protection you had or would have had against the absolute blockade of your coast?

REFERS TO WAR EXPERIENCES

The blockade in the case of Italy of all the necessities of life, the blockade in the case of France of all the allied soldiers that came to her assistance and all the munitions of war, without which she could not have carried on the struggle, would have succeeded, if it had not been for the fishing population and the mercantile population of Great Britain, and for these innumerable trawlers that sailed on every sea. It was the British craft that did it, not the Italian or the French craft. We will then see how the situation develops. Supposing that the situation in the late war reproduced itself, as M. Briand fears that it may, and supposing that France's ancient allies come to her assistance, as I hope they will, they will be dependent, for the very possibility of giving the smallest assistance to France or keeping Italy alive, upon that organization of anti-submarine craft which Italy and France at this moment are among those who are compelling Great Britain to build. I cannot conceive that that is a situation which on reflection will commend itself to any of my colleagues.

Admiral de Bon observed just now that the submarine must develop. "You could not," he said, "stop the progress of humanity." I confess that, in so far as the progress of humanity consists in inventing new methods of warfare, I would stop it tomorrow if I could, and this Conference cannot set itself to a better work than to stop it, so far as it can be stopped. I believe it can be stopped in the matter of submarines if we all decide to do it. I believe the conscience of mankind would help us. I believe the public opinion of the world would be on our side. But if we cannot do it, then let us thoroughly realize that permission for submarines is not only an increase to the burdens of the tax-paying world, it not only adds to the cost of the navies by the ships it creates, but it adds greatly to the cost of navies at all events in countries which are threatened by other peoples' submarines; it adds greatly to the cost of those navies by the non-military organization, so to speak, which it requires to have ready, and it adds largely to the number of States which can potentially, and without any cost in battleships and without any huge estimates, add themselves not to the list of nations anxious merely for self-defense, but to the list of those nations who wish to supplement their desire for an aggressive policy upon land by adding to their power on the sea.

These considerations I very earnestly press upon my colleagues. I do not believe that any of them can have faced the facts which have to be considered in this connection, though after the expression of opinion given yesterday, and after the speech after speech round this table, the British Empire has no hope of getting any important support in the course of this Conference. I do earnestly trust that our debates may go beyond the limits of this room or even of a public session.

SAYS BRITISH CAN PROTECT THEMSELVES

Here I must make a parentheses and say something I meant to say before. People are apt to think that it is Great Britain who is likely to suffer most by the continuation of submarine warfare. They look upon the map and they see that Great Britain is an island; that she is surrounded by other States; that there are multitudes of harbors over which she has no control in her immediate neighborhood, and they see on any map of commerce in the world the long lines indicating her commercial connections with either distant parts of her own Empire or the markets which she serves, or with countries from which she draws her raw material, and they say, "Here is a State which really is exposed in the utmost degree to the peril of submarines." I do not deny that our position is a difficult one; but we have had to face the difficulty and we know that we can overcome it.

Lord Lee mentioned yesterday the critical moment of the war. It was in the beginning of 1917, when I was coming over to this country and during the earlier part of my stay here. During those weeks undoubtedly we had only to add up the tonnage of destruction and subtract it from the tonnage of the world to see that if things went on as they were going on then, the war could have but one end. Yes, it was a struggle, you will remember, between the attacking forces of the submarine and the defensive forces that were brought against it. Like all these struggles between offense and defense, it had its oscillations. That was the very nadir of our fortunes. But it brought its own remedy; organization, invention, and the number of auxiliary ships gradually diminished the peril, until at the end of the war everybody felt secure, not, indeed, against cruel losses, but against destruction through losses.

And so it will be again, because we have this great population, this great naval population, this great fishing population, these innumerable craft, and admirable sailors, who showed on every occasion that when their country required it of them, or their country's allies required it of them, there was no danger or peril of battle which they were not prepared to face. No other country in Europe has that population. No other country can provide that defense against submarines. It is not there. We had to provide it for France and for Italy, and if the same circumstances came again, we should again have to provide it. Therefore I say, do not let anybody suppose, though I believe all our colleagues are bound up in this controversy, that we are the people who will suffer most if you decide, as you seem ready to decide, that submarines are to receive the sanction of this Conference. Do not suppose that, for it is not so. The fate of my own country I look to with serenity in that respect. I admit it may increase our difficulties; I know it will increase our cost and will increase it enormously, because we should have to organize all the auxiliary craft against it. But that it will imperil our security I do not believe. I do not know whether all my friends round this table can speak with equal confidence of their position.

Mr. Schanzer said:

We have listened with the greatest attention to Mr. Balfour's important speech.

Mr. Balfour has recalled England's efficient aid for Italy's supplies during the war. I wish, in the first place, to express to the British delegate who represents his country with such a great authority Italy's sincere gratitude. We shall never forget what England has done, and Mr. Balfour knows the cordial friendship for England which is traditional among the Italian people and constitutes one of the surest bases of all Italian policy.

I wish, furthermore, to express to Mr. Balfour my thanks also for the important remarks he made on the particular conditions of Italy, who depends completely on the sea for her supplies, who can be blockaded with the greatest facility, owing to the fact that the Mediterranean is like a lake, and who can be exposed to an offensive action on the part of as many as five maritime neighbors. His observations are such as to justify, better than I could ever have done myself, the position that the Italian delegation has assumed in the present debate.

Mr. Balfour has contested the utility of the submarine for coast defense. He maintains that submarines are of no help for guaranteeing the supplies of a country which is dependent on the sea, and holds, on the other hand, that they are a menace to these supplies. He has said that submarines are a danger, especially for Italy, whose coasts can be easily blockaded and whose maritime neighbors might make use of submarines as an offensive weapon. We are confronted by a substantially technical difference of opinion. Your authority and that of Lord Lee's are no doubt very great, but there are technical experts of great authority who insist upon the necessity of still maintaining submarines as a defensive weapon. This opinion is shared by our naval experts and by our government.

We are disposed, however, to pursue together with you the study of this problem, only we must point out that it does not seem possible to us today to decide on the suppression of submarines, because many of the States that could avail themselves of this dangerous weapon are not represented in this Conference.

Were we to decide today the suppression of submarines, we would evidently be placing ourselves in a dangerous condition of manifest inferiority in respect to those States which are not represented here and which might continue to use submarines. The Italian delegation believes, therefore, that this problem must be examined subsequently in a wider conference. For the present, however, one point is clear in our minds, and that is that the best course would be to follow, even in this case, the spirit of the American proposal, and consequently to limit submarines to the measure strictly necessary for the ends of a purely defensive naval policy.

The communique gives the summary of the conclusion of the debate:

In reply to Mr. Balfour, Admiral de Bon insisted that he had never wished to support the theory, which was neither his government's nor his own, that submarines had the right to destroy merchant vessels after having saved the crews. To be convinced of this, it was sufficient only to refer to the written text of his statement.

Mr. Balfour said that the last thing he had intended was to misrepresent Admiral de Bon. He was certain that if the Admiral ever had control of a navy in time of war, he would conduct the operations in accordance with the dictates of humanity and the fine traditions of the great service to which he belonged. What he had attempted to show, however, was that, if the submarine was to play the great rôle in future wars which Admiral de Bon had suggested in his speech, it could only do so by resort to extreme methods, for it was futile to suppose that submarines would make a practice of stopping merchant ships and placing prize crews on board to take them into port.

On December 24 the debate was resumed. M. Albert Sarraut, for the French, made an argument against abolition, in which he said:

Mr. Balfour, in pointing out to us the eventual danger of maintaining the submarines, has laid it down that countries which have maritime shores which have access to the sea may take advantage of this situation to gather together a force of submarines, representing a considerable aggressive strength, for use against their neighbors or against other countries. Herein lies the very danger, as pointed out by Mr. Balfour himself, which we fear and which we wish to avoid. It is suggested that we give up the idea of retaining submarines; but are all the powers possessing fleets of submarines equally anxious to support such a decision?

There are five powers here, sometimes called the "Big Three," sometimes "Big Two." We can reach decisions as far as we, ourselves, are concerned; but what will the other countries do? Who can assure us that they will submit and follow our example? And then what will happen if they continue to build submarines, either for their own use or for some one else? In what sort of situation would we find ourselves if, peradventure, war were to break out? We would have given up submarines and might be confronted with great submarine forces which other nations would have constructed, retained, or ceded to enemy powers.

This is the eventuality which must be faced. Will any one tell me that it is fantastic? The countries I have in mind, which are not represented here, and which will therefore preserve their freedom of action and their submarine forces—what way have you of persuading them or of forcing them to follow our example?

Great Britain has tried persuasion without success. These attempts were made in the deliberations preliminary to the peace treaty, during which Great Britain expressed the wish that the use of submarines be forbidden, as well as in the discussions which brought the matter up twice, if I am not mistaken, before the League of Nations. The other countries concerned refused to accept the British proposals. There was nothing surprising in this; it goes to prove that these suggestions came up against a sentiment which is very natural and which is not peculiar to the French.

OTHERS SHARE FRANCE'S VIEWS

There must be no misunderstanding on this point; the views we uphold are not the exclusive views of France; they are shared by many other countries whose ideas we only reflect. No country worthy of the name can leave to others the care of its national defense; every country has the desire and the right to assure its own safety, and not to entrust to any one else the defense of its independence or its integrity; every country tries to do this through its own means and its personal resources. Some of these countries are able to build mighty fleets and possess capital ships; but those which do not dispose of the same resources, the same financial facilities, are building or will build submarines, which constitute the weapon of the weak and are less costly. Should this right be denied them? They have no choice when they see other countries maintaining powerful fleets, without any warlike intention, to be sure, but with a view to protecting their own safety against any eventuality. Persuasion was of no avail; constraint will not succeed any better.

Besides, no one present here could ever dream of constraint, for the very simple reason that we all see the danger of taking such an attitude. I called the attention of Great Britain in a friendly way to the construction which might be given to our decisions by certain countries, and which would run counter to our common efforts to create a spirit of peace. An atmosphere of peace can only reign throughout the world if we give all peoples the assurance and guarantee that this peace is based on a feeling of equity and justice which takes the interests of all into account. The day when these peoples begin to think that we are likely to make use of moral constraint to impose on them our way of thinking—and I venture to emphasize this idea at the present moment, when the susceptibilities of nations should be carefully considered—I would be sorry to see grow up once more, around the beneficial work that we are accomplishing here, certain legends and even certain calumnies distorting the trend of our purposes, like those from which we, the French, have suffered and that we have seen only recently used against France in the press, representing her in an imperialistic attitude.

It must not be permitted that such campaigns misinterpreting our true sentiments should be initiated against any one of us—France, Great Britain, Japan, and so forth. If certain ones among us preserve more or less considerable naval forces and if we, at the same time, forbid other peoples not represented here the right to procure for themselves those smaller, but still efficacious weapons of defense which they believe they need, might not the legends to which I have referred tempt them to think that other more powerful countries wish to keep them in subjection, to force

them to place themselves under their protection and to retain them in a sort of vassalage? That is the impression which we must avoid. We must, I repeat, carefully consider the mental attitude of the peoples who are not represented here and whose susceptibilities might misconstrue the exact trend of the decisions toward which we are collaborating.

CANNOT REGULATE OTHER NATIONS

And thus, gentlemen, you perceive the conclusions to which I am leading. You cannot assume here certain obligations in the matter of submarines in the name of countries not taking part in this Conference; you can neither persuade nor coerce them; that is to say, you cannot in a way have the guarantee that they will follow the example of not constructing submarines.

Hence, in the absence of these guarantees, I consider that we cannot come to a decision. We have come to an agreement on the reduction of offensive naval armaments; but the question of means of defense must be left to the consideration of the countries interested.

I readily understand that a meeting of a general conference might be suggested in which would be represented all the countries interested in the question of submarines. In this conference might be determined the rules applying to a more humane use of submarines; the question of the principle of the retention or abolition of the use of submarines could be raised. Then all the nations interested in the question might express their opinion and really effective decisions might be reached. For the time being, I repeat, I believe that we cannot even make decisions regarding the question of the limitation of the submarine tonnage which constitutes a defensive navy, not an offensive weapon. Let the tonnage of the great ships, of the attacking vessels, be limited as we have done; that is well, and each country may make its contribution along with its personal sacrifices in the matter; but, as regards the defensive navy, it is those countries concerned which know best their needs and the situation that they must confront.

It is essentially a question which is dependent upon the sovereignty of such countries and upon the perception they have of their responsibility as to national safety.

Such, gentlemen, are the considerations that I wished to lay before Mr. Balfour. I do not know whether I shall have succeeded in convincing him, but at least the great honor of having entered into debate with him will have been mine.

Mr. Balfour replied, in part:

The argument that I brought forward in its aspect as connected with France, which is really the one on which I propose to touch at the present moment, may be put in this way: We were given to understand on the very highest authority that the danger to France in the future was a danger that comes to her from the land side, and we were told in terms of unforgettable eloquence that that danger was so great and pressed so much upon the consciences of public men and the sentiments of the French public that it was quite impossible for France to permit any diminution of land armaments. The decision thus announced had a most serious effect on the development of the work of a Conference called together to diminish armaments. This idea had to be abandoned; and the Conference found itself confined to naval disarmament alone. France, having thus put an end to all chance of even discussing disarmament by land, proceeds to develop her sea policy, and her sea policy embraces the creation of a vast submarine fleet.

DANGERS OF THE FRENCH

Now, let us consider those two positions, taken together. If the danger to France is of the magnitude which has been indicated, and if France (which Heaven forbid) will again in the future have to call upon her friends and allies, or late allies, for assistance in men and assistance in munitions, it will be, I suppose, because her great eastern neighbor has not merely revived her army, but has in part revived her navy. The one is not likely to take place without the other; both are contrary to the Treaty of Versailles. Very well.

We must then assume that there are 60,000,000 or 70,000,000 Germans against whom France has to be prepared, and we must assume that those 60,000,000 or 70,000,000 Germans are supplied, if with nothing else, at least with the easiest and the cheapest of all ships that can be built, namely, submarines. How is France going to deal with that situation?

Her building of submarines is no use at all. Let her make her fleet of submarines what she will, they do not protect either her own merchant ships or the transports of her neighbors and friends. They are weapons of offense, not, as we hear so often, weapons of defense, and in no sense would those submarines be able to give one atom of assistance to the French nation if she be threatened as I have indicated, basing my observations upon M. Briand's whole statement of the case. They would afford her no assistance in her hour of need.

To whom, then, is she going to look? There is but one nation in Europe which is or can be made, so far as I can see, adequately safe against submarine attack, and that for, I almost said, social and economic reasons which cannot well be copied. We and we alone, so far as I know, in Europe have that large population, that large seafaring population, which can be utilized for the manning of the small craft by which alone submarines can be controlled in those narrow waters—a population which, as shown conclusively by the experience of the late war, not only had the numbers, but the individual skill, courage, and capacity to deal with that situation. So that I must assume, if it be true that France, in the crisis contemplated by M. Briand, is going to call upon her ancient allies for assistance in her hour of need, it is upon our anti-submarine craft that she will be dependent for the possibility of that call being obeyed.

How is that consistent with the building of this huge mass of submarines, which anybody who looked at the matter from a strictly strategical and tactical point of view would certainly say, from the very geographical situation, was built against Great Britain? I know, and of course I accept the eloquent words that M. Sarraut has used. Of course I know that he, in his expression of friendship for Great Britain, said not one word in excess of the truth. I know it represents what comes from his heart. But no present expression of good-will, however sincere, can control the future. We must take account of facts. And when we try and combine the military policy announced by M. Briand with the naval policy announced by Admiral de Bon we cannot fail to see that here is a naval and military scheme strangely incoherent and inconsistent. Men will inevitably ask themselves, "What is the ultimate end underlying all that is being done? Against whom is this submarine fleet being built? What purpose is it to serve? What danger to France is it intended to guard against?" I know of no satisfactory answer to such questions.

AS TO OTHER NATIONS

I have so far confined what I have said strictly to the Anglo-French position, and I have tried to explain to those who I know are our friends why the position seems to the British public so inconsistent and so difficult to justify. Let me now say one word upon the more general aspect. I think there is something to be said in favor of this part of the contention of M. Sarraut. He asked us by what authority five nations at this table could legislate for the world. We cannot legislate for the world; we cannot compel the world to take our opinion. When he argues from that undeniable proposition, it has been stated by Mr. Hughes himself in a sentence which really covers the whole ground: "Even if they were ready to adopt the principle suggested by the British delegation, they would still have to await the adherence of other nations." That is a statement which I entirely accept. Even if that be granted in its full extent, as it should be granted, are we to believe, if a conference of this authority were really unanimous and really put forward upon broad moral grounds the statement that in their view submarines were not a weapon of war that was consistent with civilization, that that would have no effect? Would that not be the prelude to their ultimate abolition? Is mankind so deaf to these appeals as to make them fall

vainly upon unheeding ears? I do not think so. I think if it were possible for this Conference of the United States of America, Japan, France, Italy, and Great Britain—the five great naval powers—to give expression in fitting language to that view, it would be the beginning of a great and beneficent reform.

ARGUES FRANCE MUST MAKE DOUBLE EFFORT

M. Sarraut again spoke, saying in part:

As regards the situation of France and the policy pursued by her in safeguarding her independence and her security, Mr. Balfour, in referring to the attitude taken here by M. Briand in the land armaments and relating it to our demands in naval matters, has appeared to experience a feeling of surprise as regards this policy, which he considered as a unit—a feeling of surprise the causes of which, to tell the truth, I have had difficulty in understanding.

France, it is true, is compelled to make a double effort, military and naval. The reasons for this are simple and clear. As regards land defense, M. Briand has made here a statement of the perils against which our country is obliged to guard—a statement which every one considers final.

He has indicated, with a cogency to which I can add nothing, the necessity which confronted us of providing for our defense by retaining a burden of armaments which reduce us to a grievous servitude. It is not for our pleasure that we assume these sacrifices, and I do not believe that any one will venture to contradict this.

What is the object of our efforts on the seas? Are we impelled by some proud aspiration toward an increase of maritime power? No; you know well that we are not, since, as regards capital ships, in which lies true offensive power, that power which alone could give support to an ambitious scheme, we have made the greatest sacrifice, and are satisfied with the amount of tonnage which has been allotted to us here. It is true, we ask for submarines—but to what end? To attack our neighbors? I should not deign to reply to such a suspicion. The truth is that we are confronted by a situation of fact which Mr. Balfour must be aware of. Besides our continental coast-lines, the defense of which cannot be neglected, we possess a colonial domain whose ramifications are spread all over the world. France must have the weapon she needs to defend her possessions, just as she must have the weapon necessary to the safety of her transports and her lines of communication between the mother country and her colonies, both near and distant. In time of peace France scatters her military forces throughout her possessions; her forces, as you know, are divided among the mother country, North Africa, and her various colonies.

There is, then, a logical connection between her indispensable military power and her naval force. She should, in any event, keep the means of assuring the safe transportation of her troops to the mother country, and for this purpose decidedly she must have at her command a certain force. This is why, after having consented to this sacrifice which you have asked of us in the matter of capital ships, we come here to set forth our situation; to state in all frankness and all simplicity the obligations and the reasons of our naval program, which is based on needs whose reality cannot be doubted. And when we have laid before you the sincere, definite, and precise reasons for our program, how could we be suspected of any secret designs, against which the very frankness of our explanations protests?

MR. HUGHES HALTS DISCUSSION

At that point Secretary Hughes, as chairman of the committee, stated that it was apparent that agreement could not be reached on the British proposal to abolish the submarine. He expressed appreciation of what he believed to be the broad and noble purposes of the British spokesmen, and said that if the Balfour and Lee arguments could be answered, that answer had yet to come. Mr. Hughes said he had conferred with President Harding, and that the latter was willing to give most serious attention to any subsequent feasible effort to take up the question of abolition. For the

present, Mr. Hughes said in substance, he hoped the debate would lead to strong positions being taken against illegal use of the submarine.

THE BRITISH RESOLUTION

Before proceeding further, Mr. Balfour asked, and was granted, permission to place this statement of the British position on the record:

The British Empire delegation desires formally to place on record its opinion that the use of submarines, while of small value for defensive purposes, leads inevitably to acts which are inconsistent with the laws of war and the dictates of humanity, and the delegation desires that united action should be taken by all nations to forbid their maintenance, construction, or employment.

Mr Hughes then proposed the following substitute plan for his original proposal, made in his speech when the Conference was opened, and for the no-limit proposal favored by the French (the description of the substitute plan is as it appeared in the communique):

THE HUGHES COMPROMISE

The American delegation was entirely willing to accept, instead of 90,000 tons proposed as the maximum limit for the United States, 60,000 tons, thus scrapping 35,000 tons of the existing submarine tonnage, on the basis that Great Britain should also accept 60,000 tons as the maximum limit of submarines and scrap 22,464 tons, her present amount of submarine tonnage being 82,464 tons, according to the American figures. Then, in a desire to make whatever accommodation was possible to meet the views entertained by the other delegations, the chairman suggested that if the United States and Great Britain each reduced the maximum limit of their submarine tonnage to 60,000 tons, France, Japan, and Italy should retain the tonnage they have—in other words, maintain the *status quo* as regards submarine tonnage. He made the suggestion in order to show that, so far as the American Government was concerned, it was not in favor of anything that savored of expansion. This was a conference on limitation.

In reply to an inquiry by Lord Lee, the chairman said that he understood that the present submarine tonnage of Japan was 31,452 tons; that of France, according to the figures given the other day, was 31,391 tons, and that of Italy somewhat less—about 21,000 tons.

The committee recessed for luncheon, and when it resumed, at 3:30 in the afternoon, Senator Schanzer, for Italy, said his country was willing to accept a limitation to 31,500 tons, if she were given parity with France at that figure; Mr. Harihara, for Japan, said his country must have not less than 54,000 tons, as provided for her in the original Hughes plan; and M. Sarraut, for France, said instructions would have to be had from his government. For the British, Mr. Balfour accepted the Hughes compromise proposal.

Thereupon, after providing a committee of experts to determine a standard ton, applicable alike to each navy, for use in framing and maintaining the naval agreement, the committee adjourned over Christmas.

When work was started again, on December 28, M. Sarraut was ready with instructions from his government. They embodied formal acceptance of the capital-ship tonnage, 175,000, agreed on in the correspondence between Mr. Hughes and Premier Briand, and a final demand for not less than 90,000 submarine tonnage and 330,000 auxiliary craft tonnage. That final demand ended all hope of agreement in the Conference as to submarine and other auxiliary tonnage, except aircraft carriers.

M. Sarraut's statement included this:

SARRAUT'S LAST WORD

As a token of the good-will of France, it has been resolved to accept the reduction to 175,000 tons of her tonnage of capital ships, although it seems nearly impossible with such reduced tonnage to constitute a naval force composed of ships such as those which it is contemplated to build, and one normally organized according to the tactical principles in force in every fleet.

The conditions of application of the agreement as regards capital ships will be easy of settlement by taking into account such qualifications as it may be useful to introduce in carrying out the naval holiday through the liberty of laying down, beginning in 1927, ships intended to replace, within the limits of the admitted tonnage, French ships as they reach their 20th year of existence.

It will be likewise easy to settle the question, still outstanding, of the duration of the agreement as to the limitation of capital-ship tonnage.

After examining, on the other hand, the composition of the forces needed by France in auxiliary craft and submarines, which are specially intended for the protection of the territory and its communications, the Cabinet and the Supreme Council of National Defense have reached the conclusion that it is impossible to accept a limitation below that of 330,000 tons for auxiliary craft and 90,000 tons for submarines without imperiling the vital interests of the country and its colonies and the safety of their naval life.

The French delegation has been instructed to consent to no concession on the above figures.

To sum up, France accepts, as regards capital ships, the sacrifice which she must face in order to meet the views of the Conference, and which represents an important reduction of her normal sea power. She limits the program of the future constitution of her fleet to 330,000 tons for auxiliary craft and to 90,000 tons for submarines.

While regretting that she cannot possibly, under the present circumstances, entirely carry out the reductions and limitations contemplated in the American proposal, she at least feels quite certain that she is taking an important share in the work of the Conference by reducing the French naval power in capital ships, a weapon specifically offensive and particularly costly, and by accepting a limitation for craft of other categories.

Secretary Hughes accepted the situation, in a speech in which he expressed appreciation of the French action on capital ships and regret for its decision on submarines and auxiliary craft. There was an implied rebuke in what Mr. Hughes said. But Mr. Balfour, who followed him, spoke very directly in disapproval. The communique summarizes part of his speech as follows:

BALFOUR ANGRY

The French proposed to increase the number of submarines threefold. If they carried out that intention it was evident that they would not only be equal to the other two greatest naval powers, America and Britain, in point of tonnage, but that they would have a very much larger proportion of submarines of a newer type than either of them. He understood the submarine was still in process of development; it was still adding to its powers of offense, and each new model was an improvement on the capacity of its predecessors for commerce destruction. Thus it was certain that when that program was carried out, the French quota of submarines would exceed that of any other power in the world. It had further to be noted that their French colleagues accompanied their view of the necessity of submarines with the announcement that they intended greatly to increase the tonnage of their auxiliary craft.

It must be acknowledged that this constituted a somewhat singular contribution to the labors of a conference called for the diminution of armament. Furthermore, it had to be observed that the pleasure derived from the agreement with regard to the limitation of capital ships was subject to a qualification. He understood that the French intended to begin replacing ships in 1927. This seemed to be a serious interference with the proposal for a ten years'

naval holiday; but that was only a small part of the anxiety and disappointment which the French program had created in his mind. They had now come forward with a great building program of submarines and auxiliary craft. He was perfectly unable to conceive how that could be regarded as a defensive policy. If submarines were to be used as a strictly military weapon, in the manner contemplated by the American Advisory Committee, how came it that a fleet of capital ships limited to 175,000 tons required 90,000 tons of submarines to scout for it and protect it? And if 90,000 tons of submarines were really required for a fleet of 175,000 tons of capital ships, how many submarines would America and Britain require to build to assist their fleets of 500,000 tons?

It was perfectly obvious that the proposed 90,000 tons of submarines were intended to destroy commerce. They could not be intended for any other purpose. It therefore appeared that, at a moment when we were all assembled to discuss the limitation of armament, we were asked to agree to their increase, and that a country which did not desire to be among the first three naval powers in the world proposed nevertheless to build instruments of illegitimate warfare to an extent equal in numbers and superior in efficiency to those legitimately required by any other fleet in the world. For the moment he need say no more. The whole of this controversy would again come up before the public conference. For this occasion he reserved himself.

He must, however, dwell shortly on the effect which the French declaration of naval policy must inevitably produce upon British opinion. It was perfectly clear that if at our very gates a fleet of 90,000 tons of submarines (60,000 tons of which were to be of the newest type) was to be constructed, no limitation of any kind on auxiliary vessels capable of dealing with submarines could be admitted by the Government which he represented. Public notice had now been given in the most formal manner that this great fleet was to be built on the shores nearest to Britain, and it would necessarily be a very great menace to her. He had no doubt, if the occasion ever arose, that Britain would be equal to it, but it was on condition that we reserved the full right of Britain to build any auxiliary craft which she considered necessary to deal with the situation.

Senator Schanzer said it was not for Italy to discuss what France considers necessary for her national security, but he feared new naval competition in submarines and other auxiliaries, and found "serious preoccupations" in considering the economic burden upon Italy in such competition.

Mr. Harihara, for Japan, considered the capital-ship agreement valuable, but was disappointed that no agreement was reached on auxiliary craft. The Japanese position, he said, was to support the original American proposals in this regard.

THE FRENCH DEFENSE

M. Sarraut defended France's course in a speech in which he said:

Certain delegations, while testifying to their satisfaction in seeing France accept the reduced proportion of capital ships which has been determined for her, have expressed a real disappointment on learning that the French Government was unable to make similar sacrifices as regards other classes of vessels. Allow me to say that this disappointment, if it really exists, will call forth a similar feeling in my own country when it is learned there how the amount of tonnage allotted to France has been authoritatively determined without taking any account of her manifest needs and of the absolute necessities of her defense, for the security and safeguarding of which no country is justified in trusting to the good offices of its neighbors.

It is this idea, this conception of the true needs and interests of France and of her colonies, which has inspired the decisions of the French Government; it is this idea which is both the measure and the limit of their demand; and it is in no way influenced by any comparison with what

our neighbors are doing or by any anxiety to measure our naval force against theirs.

Herein lies the profound difference between our points of view and those of others. We have not apportioned our needs and our demands by carefully examining the consequences to the French navy of the increase of the naval power of certain neighboring countries with whom we cherish, under the happiest of conditions, relations of friendship, co-operation and alliance. We are not guarded by any fear of what their strength may be, precisely because they are friends. Great Britain, with her 525,000 tons of capital ships, will possess a fleet of great vessels stronger than the corresponding fleets of France and Italy put together.

So be it; we ourselves do not take offense. We are not the least in the world haunted by this eventuality, no more than we are apprehensive of the fact that the fleets of the other friendly nations, the United States and Japan, will be considerably increased in comparison with our fleet.

Why, then, they say, is a submarine fleet such as is demanded by France a necessity for her? Do we quibble over the needs of the others? Do we call into question their possible intentions? Do we suspect them? Assuredly we shall not do so. It is not only the right, but the duty, of each country to assure its safety by its own means, and it is perfectly possible to consider this problem without being haunted by the idea of a possible aggression on the part of a neighbor. That others should apply to us such a method of reasoning while we do not think of applying it to them, we cannot permit in any way. This would be still more painful to us, would appear to us more especially inadmissible at this table, around which we are gathered in a spirit of the most cordial co-operation and at the very moment when, in bringing the answer of France in the matter of capital ships, we are furnishing the most positive proof of the effective participation of our country in the success of the great ideals of peace aimed at by this Conference.

If our answer is not the same as for the capital ships in regard to the other categories of vessels, it is because the tonnages which we have indicated correspond to material needs of defense, to necessities of protection which must no longer be denied, for we shall not cease to affirm them strongly. We have no desire to destroy merchant vessels, as Mr. Balfour has said; we have formally declared the contrary here, and this declaration was echoed not later than yesterday, in the debates which took place in the French Senate. But France has coast-lines which she must defend; she has also, and above all, a great colonial domain, second in importance only to that of Great Britain, which is distributed over all the seas, and concerning which we also may have, I presume, our anxiety as to its defense, its police, and its surveillance.

We have the duty of safeguarding the communications of these colonies with the mother country, and I have already said here that in case of war the safety of transportation of our troops over seas to the mother country would be among the first of our obligations. This is not a mere theory. Have we not in the last war seen a belligerent transform merchant ships into auxiliary cruisers or into privateers to torpedo our transports; and has not this been done against all the allied navies? And should it cause surprise here to see the Minister of Colonies of France take account of colonial considerations and call to mind that our colonial empire, though some would seem to be ignorant of it, really exists, and that its needs, as well as its interests, must be strongly affirmed, defended, protected, especially in the matter of safe communications with the mother country?

LIMITS UPON AUXILIARY TONNAGE AND GUNS

Mr. Balfour replied briefly, and attention then was given to a proposal made earlier in the day by Mr. Hughes for limitation of the size and armament of auxiliaries. The Hughes proposal was as follows:

No ship of war, other than the capital ship or aircraft carrier, hereafter built shall exceed a total tonnage displacement of 10,000 tons, and no guns shall be carried by any such ship with a caliber in excess of 8 inches.

Lord Lee thought the limitation as to armament also

should apply to aircraft carriers. He therefore proposed the following amended rule:

No ship of war, other than a capital ship or aircraft carrier, hereafter built shall exceed a total tonnage displacement of 10,000 tons, and no gun shall be carried by any such ship, other than a capital ship, with a caliber in excess of 8 inches.

Mr. Hughes accepted the Lee suggestion. Recess was then taken for luncheon. In the afternoon meeting, the Italians accepted the proposed limit as to guns, but wanted time for instructions from home as to tonnage. Mr. Harihara, for Japan, preferred to withhold action until Admiral Baron Kato, who was absent, could attend. The matter went over, with Mr. Hughes saying that he understood there were no objections to the armament provision in the proposed rule.

THE ROOT SUBMARINE RULES

Mr. Hughes then raised the question of placing restrictions upon the use of submarines and called on Mr. Root to offer recommendations. Mr. Root offered the following:

I

The signatory powers, desiring to make more effective the rules adopted by civilized nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and non-combatants at sea in time of war, declare that among those rules the following are to be deemed an established part of international law:

1. A merchant vessel must be ordered to stop for visit and search to determine its character before it can be captured.

A merchant vessel must not be attacked unless it refuse to stop for visit and search after warning.

A merchant vessel must not be destroyed unless the crew and passengers have been first placed in safety.

2. Belligerent submarines are not under any circumstances exempt from the universal rules above stated, and if a submarine cannot capture a merchant vessel in conformity with these rules, the existing law of nations requires it to desist from attack and from capture and to permit the merchant vessel to proceed unmolested.

The signatory powers invite the adherence of all other civilized powers to the foregoing statement of established law, to the end that there may be a clear public understanding throughout the world of the standards of conduct by which the public opinion of the world is to pass judgment upon future belligerents.

II

The signatory powers recognize the practical impossibility of using submarines as commerce destroyers without violating the requirements universally accepted by civilized nations for the protection of the lives of neutrals and non-combatants, and, to the end that the prohibition of such use shall be universally accepted as a part of the law of nations, they declare their assent to such prohibition and invite all other nations to adhere thereto.

III

The signatory powers, desiring to insure the enforcement of the humane rules declared by them with respect to the prohibition of the use of submarines in warfare, further declare that any person in the service of any of the powers adopting these rules who shall violate any of the rules thus adopted, whether or not such person is under orders of a governmental superior, shall be deemed to have violated the laws of war, and shall be liable to trial and punishment as if for an act of piracy, and may be brought to trial before the civil or military authorities of any such powers within the jurisdiction of which he may be found.

Mr. Balfour expressed his warm sympathy with the proposed rules. Senator Schanzer and M. Sarraut expressed sympathy, but desired to study the rules further, and Mr. Harihara spoke in similar vein.

LIMIT UPON AIRCRAFT CARRIERS

Thereupon Mr. Hughes brought up limitation in tonnage upon aircraft carriers. The communique gives the summary of his proposal:

In the American proposal made at the opening session it had been agreed that the total tonnage of aircraft carriers should be fixed as follows: United States, 80,000 tons; Great Britain, 80,000 tons; Japan, 48,000 tons.

If the same ratio provided for capital ships should be applied to aircraft carriers for France and Italy, the result would be as follows: France, 28,000 tons; Italy, 28,000 tons.

The American proposition had added a proviso that no country exceeding the quota allowed should be required to scrap such excess tonnage until replacements began, at which time the total tonnage of airplane carriers for each nation should be reduced to the prescribed allowance. Certain other rules had been proposed.

Mr. Hughes added that, in view of the fact that aircraft carriers might approach in tonnage to capital ships, it would be wise also to set a limit in this respect. It was now proposed not to lay down any ships of this character whose displacement should exceed 27,000 tons. This was the proposition

which he now presented for discussion. He said that he thought he should add that what had appeared in the resolution regarding aircraft carriers should be deemed to be the same as that included in the resolutions respecting all ships of war except capital ships—*i. e.*, that their guns should not have a caliber exceeding eight inches. If added to the resolution regarding aircraft carriers the latter would read:

"No airplane carrier shall be laid down during the term of this agreement whose tonnage displacement is in excess of 27,000 tons, and no gun shall be carried by any such ship, other than a capital ship, with a caliber in excess of eight inches."

NO GUN HEAVIER THAN 16 INCHES

Detailed consideration of the proposal was deferred. Before adjournment, Lord Lee proposed that no warship, including the battleship, should carry a gun of greater caliber than 16 inches. The American, Italian, and Japanese delegations accepted and the French made no objection. Mr. Hughes held the rule to have been carried unanimously. With a statement from Mr. Hughes that experts were working on a replacement chart, adjournment was taken.

FAR EASTERN QUESTIONS

In the Far Eastern Committee the question of foreign troops in China, which held attention for some time, was brought to a head on December 2, when it was referred to a subcommittee on draft with instructions to bring in recommendations. The next day the long-disputed question of leased areas in China was raised, and the French proposed to restore what they hold if the other powers would follow suit. Japan and Great Britain were willing to do so only in part, and no conclusion was reached. The communique of December 3 gives an exhaustive account of the speeches of the delegates on the subject.

VIEWS AS TO LEASED AREAS

The communique follows:

Mr. Koo stated that the existence of the leased territories in China was due in the original instance to the aggressions of Germany, whose forcible occupation of part of Shantung Province constrained the Chinese Government to grant a lease for ninety-nine years of the Bay of Kiaochow, in the Shantung Province, on March 6, 1898. This was closely followed by a demand on the part of Russia for the lease of the Liaotung Peninsula, in which are found the ports of Port Arthur and Dalny, along with the demand for the right of building a railway, to be guarded by Russian soldiers, traversing the Manchurian Province from Port Arthur and Dalny to join the Trans-Siberian Railway and Vladivostok. This was later the cause of the Russo-Japanese War, which resulted in 1905 in the transfer of those territories to Japan with the consent of China. Following the lease of Kiaochow Bay to Germany and that of Port Arthur and Dalny to Russia, France obtained from China, on April 22, 1898, the lease of Kwangchowwan, on the coast of Kwangtung Province, for ninety-nine years, and Great Britain the lease, also for ninety-nine years, of an extension of Kowloon and the adjoining territory and waters close to Hongkong on June 9, 1898, and the lease "for so long a period as Port Arthur should remain in the occupation of Russia," of the port of Wei Hai Wei, on the coast of Shantung, on July 1, 1898. Both Great Britain and France based their claims for the leases on the ground of the necessity of preserving the balance of power in the Far East.

If he might be permitted to go into the history of the question, he might add that while the measures and extent

of control by the lessee powers over the leased territories vary in different cases, the leases themselves are all limited to a fixed period of years, expressly or impliedly; they are not transferable to a third power without the consent of China. Though the exercise of administrative rights over the territories leased is relinquished by China to the lessee power during the period of the lease, the sovereignty of China over them is reserved in all cases. As is stated in the beginning, these leaseholds were granted by China with the sole purpose of maintaining the balance of power in the Far East, not so much between China and the other powers, but between other powers themselves concerning China. These are all creatures of compact, different from cessions both in fact and in law.

Twenty years had elapsed since then and conditions had entirely altered. With the elimination of German menace in particular, an important disturbing fact to the peace of the Far East had been removed. Russia had equally disappeared from the scene, and it could be hoped with confidence that she would eventually return, not as the former aggressive power, but as a great democratic nation. The misrule of the Manchu dynasty, which had aggravated the situation, had also disappeared. The very fact that this conference was being held at Washington for the purpose of arriving at a mutual understanding on the part of the powers indicates an added reason for dispensing with the necessity of maintaining the balance of power in the Far East, which was the principal ground of the original claims of the different powers. In the absence of that necessity, the Chinese delegation believed that the time had come for the interested powers to relinquish their control over the territories leased to them.

The existence of such leased territories had greatly prejudiced China's territorial and administrative integrity, because they were all situated upon the strategical point along the Chinese territory. These foreign leaseholds had, besides, hampered her work of national defense by constituting in China a virtual *imperium in imperio*—that is, an empire within the same empire. There was another reason which the Chinese delegation desired to point out. The shifting conflict of interests of the different lessee powers had involved China more than once in complications of their own. It would be sufficient to refer here to the Russo-Japanese War, which was caused by the Russian occupation of Port Arthur and Dalny. The Kiaochow leasehold brought upon the Far East the hostilities of the European war. Furthermore, some of these territories were utilized with a view